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Changed Circumstances: The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Future of Institutional Reform
Litigation After Horne v. Flores
Catherine Y. Kim*
Since Brown v. Board of Education, the federal courts have played an
expansive role in institutional reform litigation to restructure state and
local government institutions, such as public school systems, prisons, law
enforcement agencies, and health care facilities accused of systemic
violations of individual rights. The propriety of such federal judicial
intervention, however, has long been the subject of heated scholarly and
political debate. In 2009, a five-member majority of the Supreme Court in
Horne v. Flores opened the door for a significant reinterpretation of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) to enlarge governmentdefendants’ ability to terminate ongoing judicial oversight in these cases,
undermining the continued viability of this model of social reform.
Regardless of one’s views on the desirability of institutional reform
litigation, the judiciary’s categorical and unilateral reinterpretation of
Rule 60(b)(5) is subject to critique. Such an approach misses a valuable
opportunity to employ the formal rule-amendment process to obtain a
more transparent, deliberative, and democratically accountable approach
to defining the optimal standard for terminating institutional reform
decrees, one that considers the varied circumstances in which the costs of
institutional reform litigation might outweigh its potential benefits.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education,1
the federal courts have played an expansive role in remedying systemic
denials of individual rights by government institutions such as public
schools. Given the enormity of such reform efforts, federal courts have
maintained continuing oversight over institutions for years, even
decades, not only enjoining current discriminatory practices, but also
restructuring institutions to eliminate vestiges of prior unlawful
practices. This model of institutional reform litigation (sometimes
alternately referred to as structural reform or public law litigation),
with active and ongoing oversight by the federal courts, has provided
impetus to social reform for generations.2
The desirability of institutional reform litigation has long been the
subject of heated debate, as scholars have contested the judiciary’s
institutional capacity to reform government institutions3 as well as the
democratic legitimacy of judicial intrusion into state and local
policymaking.4 These latter concerns, framed as charges of “judicial
1

Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Brown v. Bd. of Educ.
(Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
2
Professor Abram Chayes first referred to this new model of litigation as “public
law litigation,” Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1281, 1284-85 (1976), while Professor Owen Fiss referred to it as “structural
reform litigation,” Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2
(1979). Today, scholars frequently refer to “institutional reform litigation,” although
the other two variants remain in usage. See, e.g., Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon,
Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015
(2004) (using all three terms).
3
Compare GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008) (challenging institutional capacity of courts to bring
about social reform), with Michael A. Rebell, Poverty, “Meaningful” Educational
Opportunity, and the Necessary Role of the Courts, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1467, 1531-32
(2007) (arguing that courts are more effective in reforming government institutions
than their administrative or legislative counterparts).
4
Compare ERIC A. HANUSHEK & ALFRED A. LINDSETH, SCHOOLHOUSES,
COURTHOUSES, AND STATEHOUSES: SOLVING THE FUNDING-ACHIEVEMENT PUZZLE IN
AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS (2009) (challenging legitimacy of institutional reform
litigation on grounds of democratic accountability), ROSS SANDLER & DAVID
SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN COURTS RUN GOVERNMENT
(2004) (same), and Donald R. Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial
Supervision of Public Institutions, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1265 (1983) (same), with Chayes,
supra note 2 (defending legitimacy of institutional reform litigation), Fiss, supra note
2 (same), John C. Jeffries & George A. Rutherglen, Structural Reform Revisited, 95
CALIF. L. REV. 1387 (2007) (same), James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public
Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined: The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal
Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 183 (2003) (same), and Sabel & Simon,
supra note 2 (same).
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activism” and usurpation of political authority, have also influenced
debates in Congress.5
In its 2009 Horne v. Flores6 decision, a five-person majority of the
Supreme Court provided ammunition for the opponents of
institutional reform litigation.7 In that case, the Court applied Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5), which permits a district court to
terminate a prospective decree on equitable grounds,8 to reverse a
district court’s rejection of a government-defendant’s attempt to
dissolve an institutional reform decree. Lower courts have improperly
applied Horne broadly to categorically alter the standard and even the
burden for terminating ongoing federal decrees in all institutional
reform cases.
In recent years, the federal judiciary repeatedly has been subject to
scholarly criticism for reinterpreting procedural rules to achieve
substantive policy goals. As we will see below, Horne v. Flores and its
progeny present only the most recent manifestation of this same trend.
In contrast to prior instances, such as the voluminous criticism
following the judiciary’s decision to heighten the pleading standard of
Rule 8(a)9 in Iqbal10 and Twombly11 to further an ideological agenda,12
5
See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, An Autopsy of the Structural Reform Injunction: Oops . . .
It’s Still Moving!, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 143, 146 (2003) (discussing political opposition
to institutional reform litigation); James E. Ryan, The Real Lessons of School
Desegregation, in FROM SCHOOLHOUSE TO COURTHOUSE: THE JUDICIARY’S ROLE IN
AMERICAN EDUCATION 73, 75 (Joshua M. Dunn & Martin R. West eds., 2009)
(maintaining that debate over institutional reform litigation tends to break down
along political lines); Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions Over Time: A Case
Study of Jail and Prison Court Cases, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550, 556 (2006) (describing
contest over institutional reform litigation as one between progressives and
conservatives); Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The
Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1, 13-22 (1997) (analyzing political challenges to
institutional reform litigation).
6
Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 433-34 (2009).
7
Citing scholarly critics of institutional reform cases such as Sandler and
Schoenbrod, Michael McConnell, and Donald Horowitz, for example, the Court
emphasized the risk that elected officials would abuse institutional reform decrees as
political cover to “block ordinary avenues of political change” and “sidestep political
constraints.” See id. at 448-49. In the words of Justice Breyer, the Court’s analysis
“reflect[ed] one side of a scholarly debate about how courts should properly handle
decrees in institutional reform litigation” without acknowledging the other side. Id. at
496 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
8
See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(5).
9
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a): “A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: (1) a
short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction, unless the court
already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support; (2) a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3)
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little has been written about the judiciary’s reinterpretation of Rule
60(b)(5) to disfavor institutional reform litigation. Indeed, to date,
little of any sort has been written about Horne’s implications for the
future of institutional reform litigation.13 This Article fills that gap.
Part I provides an overview of institutional reform litigation,
including the dominant characteristics of institutional reform decrees,
a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different
types of relief.”
10
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
11
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
12
See Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure Rulemaking: Reflections on
Experience, 60 DUKE L.J. 597, 599-600 (2010) (maintaining that “[t]he new procedural
law made by the Court manifests political objectives and gives special meaning to the
term ‘judicial activism’ . . . by weaken[ing] the enforcement of public laws by private
citizens . . . thus conform[ing] to the deregulation or tort-reform politics favored by
many business interests”); Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A
Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 9-10 (2010)
(arguing that “[f]ederal civil procedure has been politicized and subjected to
ideological pressures” and describing Twombly and Iqbal “as the latest steps in a longterm trend” of a “continued retreat from the principles of citizen access, private
enforcement of public policies, and equality of litigant treatment in favor of corporate
interests and concentrated wealth”); see also Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the
Dilemma of “General Rules”, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 535, 561-62 (2009) (criticizing
Supreme Court reinterpretation of Rule 8(a) pleading standard in Twombly).
13
But see William S. Koski, The Evolving Role of the Courts in School Finance
Reform Twenty Years After Rose, 98 KY. L.J. 789, 808 n.59 (2009) (noting in the
footnote Horne’s hostility to institutional reform litigation); Eloise Pasachoff, Special
Education, Poverty, and the Limits of Private Enforcement, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1413,
1458 (2011) (acknowledging Horne’s hostility to institutional reform litigation); Alex
Reinert, Procedural Barriers to Civil Rights Litigation and the Illusory Promise of Equity,
78 UMKC L. REV. 931, 940 (2010) (identifying Horne as an exception to a general
judicial preference for injunctive relief in civil rights cases).
One possible reason for the relative dearth of scholarship in this area is the
misperception that federal courts no longer play an important role in institutional
reform litigation. See, e.g., Schlanger, supra note 5, at 553 (discussing misconception
that institutional reform litigation is dead); see also Michael Heise, State Constitutions,
School Finance Litigation, and “The Third Wave”: From Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L.
REV. 1151, 1151-53 (1995) [hereinafter State Constitutions] (noting that institutional
reform advocacy in education has shifted to state courts).
Federal courts, however, remain critical sites for challenging structural denials of
individual rights by government institutions. See infra, notes 33-50 and accompanying
text; see also Kristi L. Bowman, A New Strategy for Pursuing Racial and Ethnic Equality
in Public Schools, 1 DUKE F. FOR L. & SOC. CHANGE 47, 57-59 (2009) [hereinafter A
New Strategy] (arguing for expansive role of federal courts in securing equal
educational opportunity rights); Rebell, supra note 3, at 1467 (same); Sabel & Simon,
supra note 2, at 1021 (describing “protean persistence” of institutional reform
litigation); Schlanger, supra note 5, at 551 (challenging “conventional wisdom” that
institutional reform litigation “peaked long ago and is now moribund”).
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their continued importance today, and the development of the
doctrine on terminating these remedial decrees prior to Horne. Part II
analyzes the Horne v. Flores decision and its application of Rule
60(b)(5) to terminate an ongoing injunctive decree. It then analyzes
lower courts’ improperly broad application of Horne to mandate
termination of institutional reform decrees absent an ongoing
violation of federal law, regardless of whether the goals of the decree
have been satisfied, and even regardless of whether the decree was
entered into with the consent of the parties. It then explores the
implications of this approach, suggesting that such a broad
reinterpretation of Rule 60(b)(5) threatens the continued viability of
this form of social reform.
Part III critiques this broad and categorical approach to
reinterpreting Rule 60(b)(5) for missing a valuable opportunity to take
advantage of the insights and careful deliberation that would be gained
through the formal rule amendment process mandated by the Rules
Enabling Act (“the Act”).14 Employing this formal process would
facilitate a transparent and politically accountable normative debate
over the proper balance to strike in the trade-off between principles of
democratic policymaking and the rigorous enforcement of individual
rights. It would enable consideration of, and perhaps commission
empirical data on, the effectiveness of federal courts in reforming
public institutions. Finally, it would permit nuanced study of the
differences in the cost-benefit calculus that might apply to different
types of institutional reform decrees. Such an approach would thus
consider the complex, nuanced, and varied circumstances in which
the costs of institutional reform litigation might outweigh its potential
benefits.
I.

OVERVIEW OF INSTITUTIONAL REFORM LITIGATION

For decades, the federal courts have used comprehensive remedial
decrees with ongoing judicial oversight to restructure state and local
government institutions shown to have engaged in systemic violations
of rights. This Part describes the development of these decrees and
14

The Rules Enabling Act provides that any proposed change to a properly
enacted Federal Rule of Civil Procedure be subject to public comment; consideration
by the procedural experts of the Rules Advisory Committee, the Judicial Conference of
lower court judges, and other committees including members of the bar and
representatives from the executive branch; adoption by the Supreme Court; and a fivemonth time period for congressional consideration. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2073, 2074 (2012);
see also Carrington, supra note 12, at 605 (describing process of rulemaking in
practice).
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their continuing importance today. It then analyzes the doctrinal
standards prior to Horne for dissolving these often long-running
decrees.
A. Development of Institutional Reform Decrees
As various scholars have observed, Brown II15 ushered in a new
model of institutional reform litigation.16 This model was initially born
out of a need to counter political resistance to court orders to
desegregate public schools. The foot-dragging of Southern states in the
face of judicial mandates to desegregate made clear that a simple order
enjoining public schools from assigning students to schools on the
basis of race would not suffice.17 Meaningful equal educational
opportunity would require a comprehensive decree altering the very
structure of public schools, with ongoing judicial oversight to ensure
compliance.
Although there is no consensus definition of institutional reform
litigation,18 it typically involves a suit against a government institution
alleging systemic violations of individual rights and seeking an
expansive prospective decree and retention of jurisdiction to monitor
the defendant’s compliance with the order.19 These remedial decrees
form the centerpiece of institutional reform litigation and serve
multiple functions.20 As in traditional private-law cases, equitable
decrees entered in institutional reform litigation serve a preventative
function: to prevent future violations of the plaintiffs’ civil rights.
Institutional reform decrees, therefore, almost always enjoin
15
16

349 U.S. 294 (1955).
Chayes, supra note 2, at 1284; Fiss, supra note 2, at 2; Schlanger, supra note 5, at

552.
17
See Kristi L. Bowman, The Civil Rights Roots of Tinker’s Disruption Tests, 58 AM.
U. L. REV. 1129, 1132-34 (2009); Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Resurrecting the Promise
of Brown: Understanding and Remedying How the Supreme Court Reconstitutionalized
Segregated Schools, 88 N.C. L. REV. 787, 798-801 (2010).
18
Compare Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 447 n.3 (2009) (concluding that case
seeking remedy that would restrict a state’s ability to “make basic decisions regarding
educational policy, appropriations, and budget priorities” qualifies as “institutional
reform litigation”), with id. at 496 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (suggesting that case that
does not raise constitutional issues or involve a “comprehensive judicial decree that
governs the running of a major institution” or a “highly detailed set of orders” may
not qualify as “institutional reform litigation”).
19
See, e.g., Susan Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J.
1355, 1355 n.1 (1991) (describing slight variations in the definition of the
synonymous terms “public law litigation,” “institutional reform litigation,” and
“structural reform litigation”).
20
Chayes, supra note 2, at 1298.
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defendants from continuing to violate the plaintiffs’ rights in the
future.21 Civil rights decrees, however, often serve two additional
functions: a reparative function to “compel the defendant to engage in
a course of action that seeks to correct the effects of a past wrong” and
a structural function to eradicate the discrimination embedded in the
structure of the government institution.22
Thus, in the seminal desegregation cases, resulting judicial decrees
were not limited to prohibiting school systems from assigning students
to schools on the basis of race (preventative function). Rather, they
further sought to improve the educational opportunity of students
formerly denied the right to equal educational opportunity (reparative
function) and to restructure the daily operations of schools —
including, for example, student assignments, faculty hiring, and
remedial education programs — to ensure that no school would
remain racially identifiable (structural function).
In Green v. County School Board,23 the Supreme Court articulated the
structural function of remedial decrees. Expressly rejecting the
defendant school district’s attempt to limit the remedy to a
preventative function enjoining future race-based student
assignments, Justice Brennan’s opinion for a unanimous Court held
that formerly segregated school districts were required to take
additional steps to restructure themselves. They would be required to
alter not only the racial composition of their student bodies, but also
“every facet of school operations — faculty, staff, transportation,
extra-curricular activities and facilities”24 — that was tainted by
discrimination. Such restructuring, the Court reasoned, was necessary
to ensure conversion to a unitary system in which racial
discrimination had been “eliminated root and branch.”25
In Milliken II,26 the Court articulated the reparative function of
institutional reform decrees. In that case, the district court ordered a
school system to implement a comprehensive desegregation plan that
mandated, among other things, remedial and compensatory education
programs. Defendants argued that because the nature of its legal
21

See OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 11 (1978).
See id.; see also Chayes, supra note 2, at 1295 (“If a mental patient complains
that he has been denied a right to treatment, it will not do to order the superintendent
to ‘cease to deny’ it.”).
23
Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); see also Robinson, supra note 17,
at 805-07 (exploring the Green decision and its aftermath).
24
Green, 391 U.S. at 435.
25
Id. at 437-38.
26
Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II), 433 U.S. 267 (1977); see also Robinson, supra
note 17, at 834 (exploring the Milliken II decision and its aftermath).
22
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liability was limited to unlawful student assignments, the scope of the
remedy likewise must be limited to student assignments.27 In a
resounding rejection of this position, Chief Justice Burger held that
“where, as here, a constitutional violation has been found, the remedy
does not ‘exceed’ the violation if the remedy is tailored to cure the
condition that offends the Constitution.”28 Because the district court
found that the educational programs were necessary to restore
minority children to the position they would have occupied absent
discrimination, the Court concluded that the remedies were entirely
within the bounds of the district court’s remedial authority.29 In this
manner, the Court refused to limit the decree to a preventative
function of prohibiting current and ongoing race-based student
assignments, holding instead that the decree appropriately pursued
broader reparative functions.
The Supreme Court repeatedly justified these expansive remedial
functions based on the breadth and flexibility of the federal district
courts’ inherent equity powers in fashioning remedies. In Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,30 a unanimous Court
affirmed the district court’s inherent equitable authority to mandate
student-assignment policies utilizing “clustering” and “pairing” of
schools, as well as busing to improve racial integration and balance for
each school. In doing so, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court,
endorsed a theory of broad and flexible remedial authority of the
federal district courts: “Once a right and a violation have been shown,
the scope of a district court’s equitable power to remedy past wrongs is
broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.”31
The process of developing institutional reform decrees and the
respective roles of the parties and the court in designing the remedy
has varied from one case to the next. In cases resulting in consent
decrees, the parties negotiate a settlement agreement on their own,
either before or after a finding of liability (i.e., a judicial determination
that the government-defendant has violated individual rights), setting
forth the remedial steps the government-defendant agrees to
undertake. The parties then submit this agreement to the court for
approval and entry as a formal decree. With the court’s approval, these
27

Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 281.
Id. at 282.
29
Id. at 282, 287-88.
30
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); see, e.g.,
Robinson, supra note 17, at 808-10 (detailing Swann’s background and its impact on
institutional reform litigation).
31
Swann, 402 U.S. at 15.
28
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consent decrees become judicially enforceable through exercise of the
court’s contempt power. Regardless of whether the decree is developed
before or after the finding of liability, the government-defendant,
along with the plaintiffs, plays the leading role in designing the
remedial decree, although its negotiating leverage vis-à-vis the
plaintiffs of course is reduced subsequent to entry of a finding of
liability.
By contrast, in cases resulting in a court-ordered injunctive decree, the
court has entered a finding of liability and imposes the remedial
decree without the consent of the government-defendant. Although in
theory government-defendants play no role in shaping the remedy in
these cases, in practice they possess considerable latitude in shaping
even court-ordered injunctive decrees. In the desegregation cases, for
example, courts finding a school district defendant liable typically
invited the school system to submit a proposed desegregation plan to
be considered, along with other proposed plans, in shaping the
ultimate injunctive decree.
In these ways, institutional reform decrees vary in terms of whether
they are entered before or after a finding of liability on the part of
defendants and whether the government-defendants have consented to
the remedies imposed. Notwithstanding these differences, however,
these decrees share the defining characteristics of relying on the
breadth and flexibility of the federal courts’ equitable authority to
restructure the operation of public institutions.
B. The Contemporary Role of Institutional Reform Litigation
Although institutional reform litigation was initially developed in
the context of school desegregation, advocates quickly began
employing this model to restructure other types of public institutions,
including prisons, hospitals, mental institutions, welfare systems, and
law enforcement agencies.32 Notwithstanding periodic claims of its
death, institutional reform litigation in federal courts continues to play

32

See Fiss, supra note 2, at 3-4 (describing transfer of structural reform model to
other contexts beyond desegregation); Wendy Parker, The Supreme Court and Public
Law Remedies: A Tale of Two Kansas Cities, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 475, 580-81 (1999)
[hereinafter Public Law Remedies] (describing Supreme Court approach to public law
remedies as transsubstantive, reaching beyond desegregation cases). The University of
Michigan Law School’s Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse provides case
information on thousands of institutional reform cases against a variety of
governmental institutions, including prisons and jails, state welfare systems, and
mental health facilities, among others. See THE CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION
CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearinghouse.net/index.php (last visited Jan. 16, 2013).
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an important role in contemporary efforts to protect against systemic
violations of individual rights.33
For example, in the context of education rights, although state
courts have become increasingly active in imposing and monitoring
structural decrees over school systems,34 federal courts remain active
sites for challenges to structural discrimination in public school
systems.35 First, federal courts retain responsibility for enforcing the
scores of remaining school desegregation decrees.36 Second, and
perhaps more important, federal courts continue to enforce
congressionally created education rights, including the statutory
protections against discrimination by schools and school systems
based on race, ethnicity and national origin,37 sex,38 disability,39 and
limited English proficiency.40
For example, students with disabilities rely on federal courts to
protect against systemic violations of their rights under the Individuals
33

For a discussion of the persistence of institutional reform generally, see
Schlanger, supra note 5, at 551 (challenging “conventional wisdom” that institutional
reform litigation “peaked long ago and is now moribund”); see, e.g., Sabel & Simon,
supra note 2, at 1021 (describing “protean persistence” of institutional reform
litigation).
34
Scholars have emphasized the growing influence of state courts in institutional
reform litigation involving educational rights in the two most recent waves of school
finance reform litigation to secure educational equity and then educational adequacy
pursuant to state constitutions. See Heise, State Constitutions, supra note 13, at 115153; Rebell, supra note 3, at 1526-27.
35
See generally Bowman, A New Strategy, supra note 13, at 57-59 (2009)
(discussing “fourth wave” of education cases based on federal statutory provisions);
Liebman & Sabel, supra note 4, at 278-98 (articulating federal role in contemporary
education reform efforts); Rebell, supra note 3 (discussing role of federal courts in
securing equal educational opportunity rights).
36
See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, BECOMING LESS SEPARATE? SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT ENFORCEMENT, AND THE PURSUIT OF UNITARY
STATUS 23 (2007) (noting 266 desegregation cases that remain under court
supervision in which the Department of Justice is a party); Wendy Parker, The Future
of School Desegregation, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1157-60 [hereinafter School Desegregation]
(conducting empirical study of remaining desegregation cases).
37
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VI, 78 Stat. 252 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d (2012)).
38
Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, tit. IX, 86 Stat. 373
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681).
39
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, Pub. L. No. 91-230, 4 Stat. 175
(1970) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 (2012)); Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794
(2012)).
40
Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, tit. II, 88
Stat. 514 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701–03 (2012)).
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with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), which guarantees qualified
students an extensive set of procedural and substantive rights,
including the right to a “free and appropriate public education” with
special education and related services.41 In Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Public
Schools, a class of plaintiffs filed suit in 2001 against the Milwaukee
public school system, seeking to restructure policies for identifying
students with disabilities and the delivery of special education services
and to secure remedial educational services for those youth whose
rights have been denied.42 More recently in 2010, a class of students
filed suit against the State of Louisiana in P.B. v. Pastorek to
restructure the provision of special education services for students
with disabilities in New Orleans public schools.43
Similarly, English language learners (“ELL”) or students with
limited English proficiency (“LEP”) rely on institutional reform
litigation in federal courts to secure rights guaranteed to them under
the Equal Educational Opportunities Act (“EEOA”). Congress enacted
the EEOA in 1975 to codify the Supreme Court’s decision in Lau v.
Nichols, requiring school districts to take “appropriate action” to
overcome language barriers.44 The plaintiffs in Horne v. Flores itself
filed suit to enforce this provision, seeking a prospective decree that
would increase funding for ELL programs across the state of Arizona.
Advocates also continue to seek institutional reform decrees in
federal court to protect against systemic discrimination on the basis of
sex under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 197245 and race,
color, or national origin under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.46 For example, in Antoine v. Winner School District, a class of
Native Americans filed suit in 2006 alleging systemic race
discrimination in the imposition of school discipline and a racially

41
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (2006). But see Pasachoff, supra note 13, at 1424-27
(questioning viability of institutional reform litigation to enforce IDEA rights).
42
Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Schs., 668 F.3d 481, 484-85 (7th Cir. 2012).
43
Complaint at 4, P.B. v. Pastorek, No. 2:10-cv-04049-JCZ-KWR (E.D. La. Oct.
26, 2010).
44
See 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (2006).
45
See id. § 1681(a) (2006) (“No person in the United States shall, on the basis of
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any educational program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.”).
46
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012) (“No person in the United States shall, on the
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.”).
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hostile educational environment.47 They secured an expansive consent
decree in which the school system agreed to restructure its policies
and procedures for school discipline, incorporate a culturally sensitive
academic curriculum, and improve the academic performance of the
Native American student body.48
Federal courts also continue to play an active role in institutional
reform litigation outside of the education context. In the law
enforcement context, in United States v. Maricopa County, the United
States Department of Justice filed suit alleging that the Sheriff’s
Department run by Joe Arpaio engages in a pattern and practice of
racial profiling and harassment of Latino residents, discrimination
against jail inmates with limited English proficiency, and retaliation
for reporting abuses, in violation of Latinos’ rights under the Equal
Protection Clause and Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The complaint asks the
federal district court to impose ongoing injunctive relief to implement
structural changes to the Department’s training policies; alter the
policies and practices for conducting stops, searches, and arrests;
reform the process for complaining about officer misconduct; and
provide for increased community engagement.49
In the context of child welfare, a class of plaintiffs filed suit in April
of 2010 against the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in Connor B. v.
Patrick. Plaintiffs allege systemic abuse resulting in physical and
psychological harm for children in the state foster care system in
violation of substantive due process rights and the federal Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980.50 They seek a prospective
decree to restructure the operations of caseworkers and also increase
medical and mental health services for the children in foster care.
In these and countless other cases, advocates continue to rely on
federal courts to remedy systemic denials of rights by government
institutions. Although the cases range across different types of
government institutions and claim different types of statutory and
constitutional rights, they share the common goal of seeking the
47
Complaint at 2, Antoine ex rel. Milk v. Winner Sch. Dist., No. 3:06-cv-03007
(D.S.D. filed Mar. 27, 2006).
48
Consent Decree at 3-4, 8-10, Antoine ex rel. Milk v. Winner Sch. Dist., No.
3:06-CV-03007 (D.S.D. Dec. 10, 2007); see Catherine Y. Kim, Procedures for Public
Law Remediation in School-to-Prison Pipeline Litigation: Lessons Learned from Antoine v.
Winner School District, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 955, 970-72 (2010).
49
Complaint at 31, United States v. Maricopa County, No. 2:12-CV-00981-LOA
(D. Ariz. May 10, 2012).
50
Complaint at 1-2, 66-67, Connor B. v. Patrick, No. 3:10-CV-30073-MAP (D.
Mass. Apr. 15, 2010).
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federal courts’ intervention to restructure a state or local government
institution that has engaged in a systemic violation of individual
rights.
C. Terminating Institutional Reform Decrees
Although the judicial restructuring of government institutions often
takes years, even decades, institutional reform decrees were never
intended to operate in perpetuity. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b)(5) provides the formal mechanism for determining when an
institutional reform decree is no longer needed and judicial oversight
over the government institution should be terminated. That Rule
states, “On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its
legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding
[where] . . . applying it prospectively is no longer equitable.”51 The
Supreme Court over time has provided differing formulations to
elucidate the conditions under which termination of prospective relief
is appropriate.
1.

The Development of Rule 60(b)(5)

Even before the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had come into
existence, courts had always been understood to retain authority to
amend prospective judgments for equitable reasons.52 In 1932, Justice
Cardozo articulated this understanding in United States v. Swift &
Co.,53 involving a motion to modify a permanent injunction against a
group of meatpackers accused of violating the Sherman Antitrust Act.
Relying on “principles inherent in the jurisdiction of the chancery,”
Justice Cardozo stated: “We are not doubtful of the power of a court of
equity to modify an injunction in adaptation to changed conditions.”54
This equitable power to modify, however, was not without limit.
Rather, Justice Cardozo cautioned against attempts to modify a
previously entered decree that would unduly compromise the finality
of judgment. To protect interests of finality, the Court would permit
modification of a previously entered prospective decree only upon a

51

FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(5).
See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, From Swift to Stotts and Beyond: Modification of
Injunctions in the Federal Courts, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1101, 1105 (1968); David I. Levine,
The Latter Stages of Enforcement of Equitable Decrees: The Course of Institutional Reform
Cases After Dowell, Rufo, and Freeman, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 579, 585 (1993).
53
United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932).
54
Id. at 114.
52
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“clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen
conditions.”55
Notwithstanding this precedent, the original 1938 version of the
Federal Rules did not specify that a court could modify or terminate
an existing decree on grounds of equity. Rather, Rule 60(b) initially
permitted a court to grant relief from judgment only on grounds of
“mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect,” and only where
a motion for such relief had been filed within six months of the
judgment.56 Lower courts nonetheless continued to rely on their
inherent equity power to grant relief from prospective judgment.57
Seeking to reconcile the Rule with actual practice, the Advisory
Committee considered amending Rule 60(b) to expressly grant lower
courts the authority to amend prospective decrees on equitable
grounds. Professor James William Moore urged the adoption of such
explicit language to conform with historical practice, submitting a
memorandum to the Committee explaining, “It was also settled that
where a final decree granting a permanent injunction has become of
no use or benefit to the one whose rights were thus protected, or
where it would be inequitable to continue it, because of the
occurrence of facts and conditions since its rendition, the decree may
be modified or vacated.”58
Adopting Moore’s suggestion, the 1948 Amendments to the Rules
set forth new grounds for relief from judgment, including where
“applying it prospectively is no longer equitable.”59 This clause thus
55

Id. at 119.
FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) (1938) (amended 1946).
57
See James Wm. Moore & Elizabeth B.A. Rogers, Federal Relief from Civil
Judgments, 55 YALE L.J. 623, 643-44 (1946).
58
ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES OF CIV. PROC., MINUTES 555 (Mar. 25-26, 1946),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CV031946-min-Vol3.pdf.
59
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) today reads as follows:
56

GROUNDS FOR RELIEF FROM A FINAL JUDGMENT, ORDER, OR PROCEEDING. On
motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation,
or misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
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codified judicial discretion to grant relief from a prospective decree
based on equity principles.
Importantly, the final adopted text did not supply any further
standard to determine when prospective application would no longer
be equitable. Lower courts continued to apply the Swift standard to
hold that under Rule 60(b)(5), modification was only warranted where
the moving party could establish a “grievous wrong” would result
absent relief.60 In subsequent years, however, the Supreme Court would
develop a body of case law to guide the lower courts in terminating
prospective decrees, particularly in institutional reform cases.
2.

The Standard for Termination

The desegregation case Board of Education of Oklahoma City Schools
v. Dowell61 provided the first opportunity for the Supreme Court to
articulate a standard for granting relief from judgment through
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on
an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it
prospectively is no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). The first three grounds impose a one-year time limit for seeking
relief, while relief pursuant to the remaining three grounds must be sought “within a
reasonable time.” FED. R. CIV. P. 60(c).
Interestingly, the addition of subsection (6), but not subsection (5), caused a great
deal of controversy. Scholars expressed concern that the catch-all provision of
subsection (6) threatened to destroy any notion of finality and potentially undermine
other Rules such as Rule 44 imposing strict time limits for direct appeal. Mary Kay
Kane, Relief from Federal Judgments: A Morass Unrelieved by a Rule, 30 HASTINGS L.J.
41, 43 (1978); Note, Federal Rule 60(b): Relief from Civil Judgments, 61 YALE L.J. 70
(1952) (criticizing lack of guidance for application of Rule 60(b)(6)). To mitigate this
risk that parties would abuse Rule 60(b)(6) as a substitute for appeal, courts
interpreted it narrowly to limit its reach. The Supreme Court embraced such limits in
Klapptrott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601 (1949), by requiring that a losing party show
“extraordinary circumstances” to warrant relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6).
Subsequent case law established that such extraordinary circumstances were rare
indeed. 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2864 (3d
ed. 1998).
60
The Money Store, Inc. v. Harriscorp Fin., Inc., 885 F.2d 369, 371-73 (7th Cir.
1989); Fortin v. Comm’r of the Mass. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 692 F.2d 790, 799 &
n.12 (1st Cir. 1982); Air Transport Ass’n of Amer. v. Prof’l Air Traffic Controllers
Org., 667 F.2d 316, 323 (2d Cir. 1981).
61
Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Schs. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991); see also Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Deconstitutionalization of Education, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 111, 116
(2004) (discussing termination standard for desegregation decrees in Dowell); Levine,
supra note 52, at 624-25 (same); Parker, School Desegregation, supra note 36, at 116368 (same); Robinson, supra note 17, at 820 (same).
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termination of an institutional reform decree. Although Dowell did not
discuss the termination standard under Rule 60(b)(5), the Court has
subsequently cited Dowell in discussing the standard for termination
under the Rule.62 In Dowell, the School Board for the Oklahoma City
public schools moved to end a desegregation decree that had been in
operation for nearly thirty years.63 The district court rejected the
motion, relying on United States v. Swift to conclude that termination
was proper only if the School Board could establish that a “grievous
wrong” would result if relief was not granted. In a five-three majority
opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist held that the Swift standard was too
high a barrier to the termination of desegregation decrees, which,
unlike the antitrust decree at issue in Swift, were intended to be
temporary, with the ultimate goal of returning the school system to
local control.64
Nonetheless, the Court made clear that a government-defendant
seeking to dissolve a desegregation decree had to satisfy a significant
burden to warrant termination of judicial oversight. First, the
defendant bore the burden to show that it “had complied in good faith
with the desegregation decree since it was entered.”65 Second, it was
required to establish that “the vestiges of past discrimination had been
eliminated as far as practicable.”66 In determining whether the vestiges
had been eliminated, district courts were ordered to “look not only at
student assignments,” but also at the entire structure of the public
school system, including “every facet of school operations – faculty,
staff, transportation, extra-curricular activities and facilities.”67 Thus,
Dowell rejected a standard for termination that would limit the decree
to a preventative function, which would have permitted termination as
soon as the school system had ceased its ongoing violations of
plaintiffs’ rights by assigning students to schools in a race-neutral
fashion. Instead, Dowell endorsed the broader structural function —
requiring the school system to show that the institutional structure
had been revamped before termination would be granted.
62
Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cnty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 380 (1992); see also Parker,
Public Law Remedies, supra note 32, at 507 (noting that “the Supreme Court’s
approach to public law remedies is generally transsubstantive — principles developed
in one area of public law are applied in other areas as well”).
63
Dowell, 498 U.S. at 240.
64
Id. at 248.
65
Id. at 249-50.
66
Id. at 250.
67
Id. (internal quotation omitted); see also Parker, School Desegregation, supra
note 36, at 1164, 1167 (observing that Dowell imposed a high burden on defendants
to “prov[e] the success of the remedy”).
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Subsequent cases modified the Dowell standard for termination to
the extent it suggested that the government-defendant’s strict
compliance with the terms of the decree would always be required
prior to termination. In Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail,68 decided
the year after Dowell, a class of inmates brought suit challenging
overcrowded jail conditions. The district court found defendants
liable, and the parties negotiated a consent decree in which the
defendants agreed to build a new facility with “single cells of 80
square feet for inmates” among other “critical features.” Ten years
later, when it became apparent that limiting cells in the new facility to
a single inmate would not accommodate the sharp increase in the
inmate population, defendants moved pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5) to
modify the decree’s prohibition against double-bunking on equitable
grounds. The district court denied the motion, and the circuit court
affirmed.69
Reversing, Justice White’s opinion for the majority held that,
notwithstanding the defendant’s failure to comply with the terms of
the decree, Rule 60(b)(5) permits modification “when changed factual
circumstances make compliance with the decree substantially more
onerous,” “when a decree proves unworkable because of unforeseen
obstacles,” “or when enforcement of the decree without modification
would be detrimental to the public interest.”70 In announcing this new
formulation, the Court emphasized the need for district courts to
retain flexibility to modify prospective decrees.71 Thus, although Rufo
appeared to eliminate the Dowell requirement that a defendant comply
with all of the terms of a decree in order to justify termination, it
affirmed prior precedent holding that the party seeking modification
bears the burden of persuasion to show that modification is
warranted.72
In addition, Rufo affirmed the authority of the district court to
preserve a consent decree, even after the preventative function had
been accomplished. It expressly rejected the position that a structural
68
Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cnty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (1992); see Levine, supra
note 52, at 596.
69
Inmates of Suffolk Cnty. Jail v. Kearney, 734 F. Supp. 561, 566 (D. Mass. 1990),
aff’d, 915 F.2d 1557 (1st Cir. 1990).
70
Rufo, 502 U.S. at 384.
71
Id. at 381 (“The experience of federal courts in implementing and modifying
such decrees has demonstrated that a flexible approach is often essential to achieving
the goals of reform litigation.”).
72
Id. at 383 (“[A] party seeking modification of a consent decree bears the burden
of establishing that a significant change in circumstances warrants revision of the
decree.”).
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decree entered with the consent of the parties could do no more than
require compliance with the minimum legal requirements necessary to
avoid an ongoing violation of law. The Court reasoned:
Federal courts may not order States or local governments, over
their objection, to undertake a course of conduct not tailored
to curing a constitutional violation that has been adjudicated.
But we have no doubt that, to save themselves the time,
expense, and inevitable risk of litigation, petitioners could
settle the dispute over the proper remedy for the constitutional
violations that had been found by undertaking to do more
than the Constitution itself requires (almost any affirmative
decree beyond a directive to obey the Constitution necessarily
does that), but also more than what a court would have
ordered absent a settlement.73
For these reasons, the Court emphasized that “a proposed
modification should not strive to rewrite a consent decree so that it
conforms to the constitutional floor.”74 In this manner, Rufo preserved
the district court’s ability to pursue structural reform by retaining
oversight over a consent decree, even where the defendant had ceased
its violation of rights and conformed to the minimum legal
requirements.
Frew v. Hawkins75 provided an additional gloss on the standard for
determining when to terminate institutional reform decrees. In Frew,
involving a challenge to Texas’s administration of the federal Medicaid
statute, the parties entered a consent decree prior to any adjudication
of liability. Pursuant to the decree, the State agreed to extensive and
detailed requirements for the provision of services that went far
beyond the “brief and general mandate of the statute itself.”76 When
the State subsequently challenged the enforceability of the decree on
sovereign immunity grounds, the Court in a unanimous opinion by
Justice Kennedy invoked Rule 60(b)(5) as the proper vehicle for
determining whether relief was warranted.
In doing so, the Court held that termination under the Rule would
be proper where “the [objects of the decree] have been attained.”77 It
reasoned that in institutional reform cases, lower courts must
“exercise their equitable powers” in conformity with this standard to
73
74
75
76
77

Id. at 389 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Id. at 391.
Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431 (2004).
Id. at 441.
Id. at 442.
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ensure that “responsibility for discharging the State’s obligations is
returned promptly to the State and its officials.”78 As in Rufo, the Court
noted that the burden of persuasion rested with defendants to show
that termination was warranted.79
Frew did not provide any additional guidance on how lower courts
were to define the “objects of the decree.” Previously, Dowell had
suggested that the “object of the decree” might be the total
restructuring of a public school system. Rufo had suggested that the
object of a properly negotiated consent decree might reach far beyond
the minimum statutory or constitutional floor. Without articulating
any further guidance, Frew appeared to leave intact the district court’s
discretion, in exercising its equity powers, to make this determination.
A few principles can be gleaned from these cases taken as a whole.
First, the Supreme Court has provided various formulations for
determining when termination of a prospective decree is appropriate
pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5). With one partial exception, the Court has
never suggested that any holding in this line of cases from Dowell to
Rufo to Frew has been overruled, and the differing standards
announced in each case must be interpreted in a manner consistent
with the standards announced in the other two cases. Although the
portion of Dowell requiring strict compliance with a decree’s
requirements prior to termination has been cast into doubt by Rufo
and Frew, the portion of Dowell holding that the standard for
termination requires a defendant to show it has successfully
eliminated the vestiges of its prior unlawful conduct to the extent
practicable appears to remain good law. At the same time, this
standard must be reconciled with Rufo’s holding that Rule 60(b)(5)
permits termination where changed circumstances render continued
enforcement against the public interest, as well as Frew’s formulation
that termination under Rule 60(b)(5) is mandated where the
objectives of the decree have been attained.
Second, the cases consistently emphasize that the district court
retains broad discretion in determining when termination is
warranted. Frew holds that termination is required when the decree’s
objectives have been attained, but does not appear to limit the district
court’s definition of those objectives. Indeed, Rufo holds that the
objectives of a decree entered with the consent of the parties may
properly reach beyond minimal compliance with the constitutional or
78

Id.
See id. (“If the State establishes reason to modify the decree, the court should
make the necessary changes; otherwise, the decree should be enforced according to its
terms.”).
79
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statutory floor. Thus, the absence of an ongoing violation of statutory
or constitutional rights, standing alone, does not justify terminating
the decree.
Third, the case law makes clear that the party seeking to terminate a
decree — typically the government-defendant — bears the burden of
persuasion to show that the relevant standard for modification or
termination has been met.
II.

HORNE V. FLORES AND SUBSEQUENT INTERPRETATIONS OF RULE
60(B)(5)

Although federal courts continue to play an expansive role in
restructuring state and local government institutions, many have
grown increasingly skeptical of this model of social reform. Most
recently, the Supreme Court’s 2009 decision in Horne v. Flores80
opened the door for lower courts to reinterpret Rule 60(b)(5) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to dramatically enlarge governmentdefendants’ ability to terminate judicial oversight in these types of
cases. This Part analyzes the Horne decision and the differing possible
interpretations of its application of Rule 60(b)(5). It then sets forth
lower courts’ improperly broad interpretation of Horne, resulting in a
categorical reduction in the standard and burden for terminating
judicial oversight in institutional reform cases. Finally, it explores the
likely impact of the Horne decision on the future viability of
institutional reform litigation.
A. Facts
In 1992, a group of ELL students enrolled in the Nogales School
District along the Arizona-Mexico border filed a class action suit
alleging that the State inadequately funded ELL programs in violation
of rights protected by the Equal Educational Opportunities Act.81
Plaintiffs named as defendants the State of Arizona (“Defendant
State”), the Arizona State Board of Education (“Defendant State
Board”), and the Arizona State Superintendent of Public Education
(“Defendant State Superintendent”).
After trial, the district court found the defendants in violation of the
EEOA, which requires states to take “appropriate action” to overcome

80

Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433 (2009).
Id. at 438; see Kristi L. Bowman, Pursuing Educational Opportunities for Latino/a
Students, 88 N.C. L. REV. 911, 959 (2010) [hereinafter Pursuing Educational
Opportunities] (discussing Horne’s analysis of EEOA standards).
81
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language barriers for ELL students,82 by providing a level of ELL
program funding in Nogales School District that was “arbitrary and
capricious and bore no relation to the actual funding need.”83 To
remedy this violation, the court entered a prospective decree ordering
defendants to conduct a cost-study to determine the amount of
funding necessary to implement an effective ELL program and to
develop a funding mechanism rationally related to that amount.84
Defendants did not appeal the order but neither did they attempt to
comply.85 After over five years of inaction, the district court entered a
contempt order against defendants and ordered the state legislature —
which had not been party to the suit — to “appropriately and
constitutionally fund the state’s ELL programs.”86 In March 2006, after
accruing over $20 million in contempt fines, the state legislature
passed H.B. 2064, increasing funding for ELL students and providing
for programmatic and structural changes to the statewide ELL
program.87
Upon enactment of H.B. 2064, Defendant State Superintendent,
joined by leaders of the state legislature seeking to intervene, moved to
dissolve the district court’s decree pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b)(5). They claimed that a “significant change in
circumstances” warranted relief from the judgment, citing increases in
funding for ELL students, the replacement of bilingual education
instructional programs with English immersion programs in the state,
and various changes specific to Nogales School District, including
82
20 U.S.C. § 1703 (2006) (“No state shall deny equal educational opportunity to
an individual on account of his or her race, color, sex, or national origin by . . . (f) the
failure by an educational agency to take appropriate action to overcome language
barriers that impede equal participation by its students in its instruction programs.”).
83
Horne, 557 U.S. at 480 (internal citation omitted). The Fifth Circuit in
Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F. 2d 989 (5th Cir. 1981), interpreted the EEOA provision
at issue to require that: (1) the school system’s selected instructional program for ELL
students rests on sound educational theory; (2) the practices, resources, and personnel
allocated to the program are reasonably calculated for effective implementation; and
(3) the performance outputs of the program demonstrate success in actually
overcoming language barriers. Every lower federal court to examine the issue has
adopted the Castaneda test, as have the Departments of Justice and Education. See
Bowman, Pursuing Educational Opportunities, supra note 81, at 930 (discussing
Castaneda test). Congress created an express private right of action to enforce the
EEOA’s provisions in federal district court. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1706, 1708 (2006). The
district court in Horne concluded that the defendants had failed the second prong of
the Castaneda inquiry.
84
Horne, 557 U.S. at 479-80.
85
Id. at 441.
86
Id. at 441-42.
87
Id. at 442.
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changes in administration and funding and the improved academic
performance of ELL students in that district. After an eight-day
evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the Rule 60(b)(5)
motion, finding that the State continued to fund ELL instruction in an
“arbitrary and capricious” manner that “bore no rational relation to
the actual funding needed” and that the moving parties had failed to
show changed circumstances warranting modification.88 The Ninth
Circuit affirmed.89
Justice Alito reversed for a five-member majority of the Court,
holding that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to
terminate the decree. In doing so, the Court expressed skepticism
about institutional reform litigation, underscoring particular facts of
the case that, in the majority’s view, exacerbated the democratic
accountability concerns inherent in these types of cases.90
1.

Party Alignment

In Horne, the Court emphasized the threat to democratic
accountability posed by institutional reform decrees. Speaking of
structural decrees in general, the Court noted:
[P]ublic officials sometimes consent to, or refrain from
vigorously opposing, decrees that go well beyond what is
required by federal law . . . . Injunctions of this sort bind state
and local officials to the policy preferences of their
predecessors and may thereby improperly deprive future
officials of their designated legislative and executive
powers . . . . Where state and local officials inherit overbroad
or outdated consent decrees that limit their ability to respond
to the priorities and concerns of their constituents, they are
constrained in their ability to fulfill their duties as
democratically-elected officials.91
In this case, none of the defendants challenged the original district
court finding that the Nogales School District was in violation of the
EEOA on appeal.92 This failure to appeal, in the Court’s view,
heightened the risk that the putative defendants actually embraced the
88
Flores v. Arizona, 480 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1167 (D. Ariz. 2007), aff’d 516 F.3d
1140 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433 (2009).
89
Flores v. Arizona, 516 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2009).
90
Horne, 557 U.S. at 447-50.
91
Id. at 448-49 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
92
Id. at 442.
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remedial decree, hoping to achieve policies aligned with their
institutional priorities that would then become immune from political
contest.93 Indeed, the Attorney General took the unusual step of
requesting that the district court extend the injunctive order statewide,
concerned that any district-specific funding remedy would run afoul
of the state constitution requiring a “general and uniform public
school system.”94
Moreover, at no point after the finding of liability did the three
named defendants claim or attempt compliance with the terms of the
decree. Rather, they placed the onus on the legislature to produce the
funding necessary for compliance. The Court observed, “[t]he record
suggests that some state officials have welcomed the involvement of
the federal court as a means of achieving appropriations objectives
that could not be achieved through the ordinary democratic
process.”95
When the legislature finally acted, only one of the three original
defendants, joined by the state legislators, moved to terminate the
decree. The other two defendants concluded that the State’s funding
for ELL programming remained insufficient and opposed the motion.
Citing this realignment, the Court stated, “[p]recisely because
different state actors have taken contrary positions in this litigation,
federalism concerns are elevated.”96
In the majority’s view, the unusual alignment of parties on the Rule
60(b)(5) motion “turned the risks of institutional reform litigation
into reality” by permitting at least some defendants to collude with
plaintiffs to develop favorable policy to be imposed through a judicial
decree, which would then become insulated from subsequent political
challenge and amendment.97
2.

Funding Remedy

In addition, the Court expressed concern that the particular remedy
imposed in Horne exacerbated the federalism concerns inherent in
many institutional reform decrees. These concerns involve the
93

Id. at 448-50.
Id. at 472 (“We are told that the former attorney general affirmatively urged a
statewide remedy because a Nogales only remedy would run afoul of the Arizona
Constitution’s requirement of a general and uniform public school system.”) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
95
Id. at 447 n.3. But see id. at 489 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (contesting majority’s
characterization that defendants “welcomed” the decree).
96
Id. at 452.
97
See id. at 452-53.
94
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propriety of a politically unaccountable federal court inserting itself
into the domain of state and local policymaking. As the Court stated,
“institutional reform injunctions often raise sensitive federalism
concerns” because they “commonly involve[] areas of core state
responsibility, such as public education.”98 The exclusive remedial
focus of Horne — commanding the state legislature to appropriate
funds — clearly troubled the majority, uncomfortable with the specter
of federal district courts commanding state legislatures to allocate
specific dollar amounts to particular education programs. “Federalism
concerns are heightened when, as in this case, a federal court decree
has the effect of dictating state or local budget priorities.”99
In these ways, the facts of Horne underscored the risks to democratic
accountability and federalism principles inherent in federal
institutional reform cases generally.
B. Application of Rule 60(b)(5)
In light of these facts, which in the Court’s view exacerbated more
general concerns about institutional reform litigation, the Court
concluded that the government-defendant was entitled to terminate
the prospective decree pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5). Moreover, lower
courts have employed a broad interpretation of Horne to categorically
reduce the standard for terminating institutional reform decrees,
replacing the textual and precedential commitment to a balancing of
equities under Rule 60(b)(5) — manifest in the phrase “is no longer
equitable” — with the imposition of a rigid rule requiring termination
where there is no longer an ongoing violation of law. In addition,
while Horne affirmed that the defendant bears at least the initial
burden in a Rule 60(b)(5) motion, at least one lower court has applied
Horne to impose a lesser burden on a moving defendant that more
closely resembles a burden of production rather than the usual burden
of persuasion; the ultimate burden of persuasion on the question of
termination has been shifted to the nonmoving plaintiff.
1.

Standard for Termination

Horne opened the door for a transformation of the standard for
terminating injunctive relief in institutional reform cases. As set forth
below, lower courts have relied on Horne to reinterpret Rule 60(b)(5),
which permits relief from judgment whenever “applying prospectively
98
99

Id. at 448.
Id.
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is no longer equitable,” to mandate termination where there is “no
ongoing violation of federal law.”
Concluding that the district court abused its discretion in denying
defendants’ motion to terminate, the Horne majority held that in
determining the merits of the Rule 60(b)(5) motion, the lower court
was required to “ascertain whether ongoing enforcement of the
original order was supported by an ongoing violation of federal law
(here, the EEOA).”100 Citing Frew for the proposition that a decree
must be terminated where its objectives have been attained, Horne
continued: “a critical question in this Rule 60(b)(5) inquiry is whether
the objective of the District Court’s 2000 declaratory judgment order
— i.e., satisfaction of the EEOA’s ‘appropriate action’ standard — has
been achieved.”101 Once the ongoing violations of federal law had
ceased, termination would be mandated.
Horne’s description of the standard for terminating injunctive
decrees under Rule 60(b)(5) remains subject to varying
interpretations. On the one hand, lower courts might adopt a narrow
interpretation of Horne by confining the holding to the facts of that
case. Under this narrow reading, termination would be mandated
absent an ongoing violation of law only where the parties seek relief
under the EEOA, or only where the decree’s objectives were, in fact,
limited to preventing ongoing violations of law.
Lower courts might minimize the breadth of Horne by applying its
description of the proper standard for termination to cases brought
under the Equal Educational Opportunities Act only. In holding that
dissolution under Rule 60(b)(5) is required where there is no ongoing
violation of federal law, the Court stated, “[w]e note that the EEOA
itself limits court-ordered remedies to those that are essential to
correct particular denials of equal educational opportunity or equal
protection of the laws.”102 Based on this language, a lower court might
conclude that although a decree entered pursuant to the EEOA must
be terminated upon the cessation of ongoing violations of the law, a
decree entered pursuant to other federal laws — including
constitutional provisions — is not so limited.
Similarly, lower courts might limit Horne’s description of the proper
standard for terminating a decree to cases in which the objectives of
the decree were in fact limited to stopping ongoing violations of the
law. The decree entered by the district court in Horne sought only to
prevent defendants from continuing to provide inadequate funds for
100
101
102

Id. at 454-56.
Id. at 450.
Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1712 (2006)).
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ELL programs in violation of the EEOA; it did not seek any other
structural or reparative functions. A narrow interpretation of the case
might thus conclude that Horne is inapplicable to other decrees with
broader objectives, such as desegregation decrees serving reparative
and structural functions or consent decrees requiring compliance
beyond the statutory or constitutional floor.
On the other hand, lower courts might adopt an expansive reading
of Horne, concluding that Rule 60(b)(5) requires termination absent
an ongoing violation of law in all institutional reform cases, regardless
of whether the case involved the EEOA or some other federal law,
whether the objectives of the decree reached beyond the bare
minimum constitutional or legal floor, or indeed whether the decree
was entered into with the consent of the parties.
Unfortunately, lower courts have tended to opt for such a broader
reading of Horne. No lower court to date has limited the applicability
of Horne to cases brought under the EEOA. For example, in Petties v.
District of Columbia,103 a case arising not under the EEOA but rather
under the IDEA, the district court had imposed a prospective decree
requiring the District of Columbia to timely provide payments to
providers of special education services. The Court of Appeals applied
Horne to reverse the district court’s denial of the governmentdefendant’s Rule 60(b)(5) motion to terminate because there was no
evidence of an ongoing violation of law.
Moreover, lower courts have applied Horne to require termination
absent an ongoing violation of law without considering, for example,
whether the vestiges of prior unlawful conduct have been eliminated,
whether the public interest is served by preserving the decree, or
whether the initial objectives of the decree have been attained. Indeed,
some courts have even gone so far as to require termination of a
consent decree absent an ongoing violation of law. In Consumer
Advisory Board v. Harvey, the district court for the District of Maine
applied Horne to grant the government-defendant’s motion to
terminate a prospective decree absent evidence of an ongoing violation
of law, even though the decree was entered into with the consent of
the parties. In that case, the government-defendants had consented to
a decree under which they agreed to improve conditions for
involuntarily confined residents of a state-run mental institution.104
Defendants subsequently moved to terminate pursuant to Rule
60(b)(5), although they had failed to comply with many of the

103
104

662 F.3d 564 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
Consumer Advisory Bd. v. Harvey, 697 F. Supp. 2d 131, 132-33 (D. Me. 2010).
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substantive requirements of the decree. Granting defendant’s motion,
the district court cited Horne to conclude, “to the extent that the 1994
Consent Decree can be read to include multiple substantive
requirements that extend beyond the requirements of the Constitution
and federal law, the Decree falls squarely within the category of
decrees” that “may improperly deprive future officials of their
designated legislative and executive powers.”105 In response to the
plaintiffs’ attempt to distinguish the court-ordered injunctive decree
entered in Horne from the consent decree entered in their own case,
the district court held that “these differences did not change the
applicability of Horne to this case.”106
Such a categorical reading of Horne to reduce the standard for
terminating prospective decrees in all institutional reform cases, rather
than limiting Horne to its particular facts, contravenes the express
language of Rule 60(b)(5), which requires a case-by-case balancing of
the equities. Moreover, such a broad reading of Horne, requiring
termination whenever there is no longer an ongoing violation of law,
repudiates earlier cases’ explicit rejection of the notion that relief must
be limited to preventing ongoing violations of law. It contravenes the
long line of cases affirming federal district courts’ discretion to order
broad remedies that seek not only preventative relief, but also
structural and reparative relief as well.
Dowell held that termination of a desegregation decree would only
be appropriate where the government-defendant could show that all
“vestiges of prior discrimination have been eliminated to the extent
practicable.”107 It made clear that a school system that formerly
operated a de jure segregated system could not terminate judicial
oversight merely by showing that the preventative function of the
decree had been achieved. Although it was no longer assigning
students to schools on the basis of race in violation of law, the school
system would be required to show that the structural and reparative
functions of the decree had also been achieved.108
Similarly, although Rufo held that “changed circumstances” might
warrant modification, it affirmed that an institutional reform decree —
at least one entered into with the consent of the parties — could
properly reach beyond the minimum statutory or constitutional floor.
105

Id. at 137.
Id.; see also United States v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 663 F. Supp. 2d 649, 656
(N.D. Ill. 2009) (stating in the context of a desegregation case, “the Horne opinion
makes no distinction between court-ordered or consent decrees”).
107
Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Schs. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 250 (1991).
108
See supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
106

2013]

Changed Circumstances

1463

In these circumstances, a consent decree would remain in force even
absent an ongoing violation of law.109
Finally, although Frew held that termination would be proper where
“the objectives of the decree have been attained,” it did not purport to
limit the permissible objectives of a decree in any way. Instead, it
appeared that district courts retained discretion to determine the
purposes of a decree — be they preventative, reparative, structural, or
even something altogether different in the case of properly negotiated
consent decrees, as suggested in Rufo.110
Fortunately, not all cases have extended Horne to require
termination of all institutional reform decrees absent an ongoing
violation of law. In Evans v. Fenty,111 involving the treatment of
institutionalized individuals with developmental disabilities,
defendants moved to vacate the consent decree, arguing that although
they had failed to comply with the decree, the orders should
nonetheless be vacated because there was no current and ongoing
violation of federal law. Rejecting the motion, the district court for the
District of Columbia emphasized that Horne involved a litigated
judgment and did not overrule Frew and Rufo, which held that consent
decrees may reach beyond the bare bones of what a court could order
absent government consent.112 This reading of Horne is consistent with
the traditional understanding that government-defendants may
consent to requirements beyond what a federal court could on its own
impose. It is also consistent with Rufo, which expressly prohibited
courts from attempting to rewrite consent decrees to conform to the
constitutional or statutory floor.
These divergent approaches suggest that the future of institutional
reform litigation largely depends on whether lower courts employ the
Horne standard for termination broadly or narrowly. To date, at least
some courts have opted for the broader application, contravening the
text of Rule 60(b)(5) and the long line of preceding cases interpreting
that provision.
109

See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
111
Evans v. Fenty, 701 F. Supp. 2d 126 (D.D.C. 2010).
112
Id. at 165-66; see also Juan F. v. Rell, No. 3:89-CV-859 (CFD), 2010 WL
5590094, at *3 (D. Conn. Sept. 22, 2010) (“But the defendants overstate the impact of
Horne . . . . Horne did not call into question a district court’s authority to enforce a
validly entered Consent Decree negotiated by the parties.”); LaShawn A. ex. rel. Moore
v. Fenty, 701 F. Supp. 2d 84, 98-100, 115 (D.D.C. 2010) (denying defendant’s Rule
60(b)(5) motion to terminate decree in case challenging administration of child
welfare system, reasoning that Horne preserves the holding in Frew allowing consent
decrees to require more than the court could order absent consent of the parties).
110
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Defendant’s Burden

In addition, at least one lower court has applied Horne to reduce the
burden borne by defendants in moving for termination. In Horne, the
majority expressly affirmed that in a Rule 60(b)(5) motion, as with all
motions, “the party seeking relief bears the burden of establishing that
relief is warranted.”113 However, the manner in which the Court
applied this burden might be interpreted as imposing on defendants a
more modest burden of production rather than the traditional burden
of persuasion. It thus opens the door for lower courts to impose the
ultimate burden of persuading the court on the question of whether
termination is warranted on the nonmoving plaintiff.
In Horne, defendant-movants pointed to four purported changes in
circumstances to argue for dissolution of the decree, including an
increase in educational funding for ELL students, the adoption of a
new ELL instructional methodology, the improved performance of
ELL students in Nogales School District, and structural and
management reforms in the Nogales School District.114 The district
court heard evidence on these facts during an eight-day hearing, but
ultimately found that, although there were improvements in the
provision of ELL services in the State, defendants ultimately failed to
establish compliance with the EEOA.115
The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the district court
abused its discretion in denying the motion. Importantly, the Court
did not conclude that the proffered changes constituted sufficient
evidence of current compliance; instead, it remanded the case back to
the district court for further litigation. This posture suggests that
defendant-movants may bear only a burden of production rather than
a burden of persuasion to trigger further litigation on the Rule
60(b)(5) motion. If the defendant-movants bore the burden of
persuasion, the absence of any court’s finding that the requisite
standard had been satisfied — in this case compliance with the EEOA,
according to the Court — would properly result in the denial of the
motion. Yet, the holding that the district court abused its discretion in
denying the motion might be interpreted as imposing on the
defendant-movant only a burden of production — to show there was
some question as to whether it was currently in compliance — to
warrant further litigation.

113
114
115

Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 447 (2009).
Id. at 459.
Id. at 473 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Such a reduction of the initial burden would place prevailing
plaintiffs at the disadvantage of having to re-litigate the central
question of defendant’s liability in order to sustain judicial oversight
and involvement every time the defendant satisfies a mere burden of
production by suggesting it may now be in compliance with the law.116
As Justice Breyer’s dissent observed, the Horne ruling
[c]reates a dangerous possibility that such orders, judgments
and decrees, long final or acquiesced in, will be unwarrantedly
subject to perpetual challenge, offering defendants
unjustifiable opportunities endlessly to relitigate underlying
violations . . . . What else is it doing by putting the plaintiff or
the court to the unnecessary burden of reestablishing what has
once been decided?117
Moreover, although the Court did not address the issue, it is at least
possible that once this burden of production is satisfied, the ultimate
burden of persuasion may shift back to plaintiffs during litigation over
the Rule 60(b)(5) motion.
Again, lower courts’ application of the burdens of production and
persuasion will determine the precise impact of Horne on the future of
institutional reform cases. At least one lower court decision to date
appears to have applied the ultimate burden of persuasion on
plaintiffs. In the unpublished decision of Basel v. Bielaczyz,118 plaintiffs
had obtained a favorable consent decree after filing a procedural due
process challenge to the timeliness of hearings on applications for
state-administered welfare benefits. On defendant’s subsequent Rule
60(b)(5) motion to terminate the decree, however, the Eastern District
of Michigan applied an expansive interpretation of Horne to place the
burden of persuasion on the plaintiff to establish a current and
ongoing violation of law to justify preserving the decree.119 The court
acknowledged that the plaintiffs had previously filed several contempt
motions alleging defendants’ noncompliance with the decree, but
pointed out that none of these motions had been successful. It then
stated that in light of various changes in the policies and practices of

116
See Kane, supra note 59, at 68 (“[A] system of relief that even suggests to
litigants that it may be worthwhile to bring such motions should be questioned.”).
117
Horne, 557 U.S. at 493 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
118
Basel v. Bielaczyz, No. 74-40135-BC, 2009 WL 2843906 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 1,
2009).
119
Id. at *6 (citing Horne for proposition that “the court must ‘ascertain whether
ongoing enforcement of the original order [is] supported by an ongoing violation of
federal law’” (quoting Horne, 557 U.S. at 454)).
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the State, “whether the plaintiff class would have viable federal claims
today is highly questionable.”120 Given plaintiff’s failure to prove a
current and ongoing violation of law, the district court concluded that
dissolution was warranted.
C. Implications of Horne for the Future of Institutional Reform
Litigation
In this manner, Horne and its progeny have made it significantly
easier for government-defendants to terminate ongoing decrees in
institutional reform cases. At least some lower courts have interpreted
Horne broadly to require termination of a decree any time the
defendant satisfies a burden of production suggesting that it is no
longer in violation of law and the plaintiff fails to satisfy the shifted
burden of persuasion to prove otherwise. In these cases, termination
has been deemed mandatory regardless of whether the defendant
complied with the terms of the decree, regardless of whether the
decree’s objectives had been achieved, and regardless of whether the
decree was entered into with the consent of the parties. Lower courts’
expansive application of Horne suggests that plaintiffs will no longer
be able to obtain, or at least preserve, institutional reform decrees that
go beyond merely preventing ongoing violations of law; the structural
and reparative functions of decrees are now in question.
Moreover, application of the Horne standard to consent decrees will
mean that plaintiffs who successfully negotiated a consent decree with
defendants will no longer be entitled to the benefit of that bargain,
because the decree may be terminated to the extent it requires more
than a mere cessation of ongoing violations of law. Significantly, this
application of Horne to consent decrees would also have a negative
impact on defendants and the efficiency of the judicial system, because
plaintiffs in institutional reform cases would no longer have an
incentive to settle cases and would seek to establish liability and
obtain court-ordered relief in every case.
In addition, the reduction of the burden on defendants in a Rule
60(b)(5) motion to terminate increases the likelihood that
institutional reform decrees will be dissolved prematurely, perhaps
even before the defendant achieves compliance with federal law, given
the resource constraints of these types of cases. As it is, plaintiffs who
file institutional reform cases — cases seeking injunctive relief and
generally foregoing claims for money damages — must rely on a
handful of public interest organizations or law firms working pro bono
120

Id. at *8.
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to fund and litigate these comprehensive and long-running cases.121
Such counsel may not be able or willing to devote the necessary
resources to repeatedly re-litigate the question of liability,122
particularly where evidence from the initial liability trial has become
stale.123 Alternatively, they might choose to devote their limited
resources to defending against Rule 60(b)(5) motions, thereby
declining to file new enforcement actions in other institutional reform
cases.124 Indeed, although an empirical analysis of the precise impact
of the Horne decision is beyond the scope of this Article,125 the
parallels between Horne and the Prison Litigation Reform Act of
1996126 suggest that, unless confined to its facts and procedural
context, Horne could significantly curtail the continued viability of
institutional reform litigation.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) expressly sought to
cabin the remedial authority of federal courts by curbing judicial
intrusion into the operation of state prisons. Of particular relevance to
the Horne analysis, section 802(a) of the PRLA provides, “In any civil
action with respect to prison conditions in which prospective relief is
ordered, such relief shall be terminable upon the motion of any party
or intervener” unless “the court makes written findings based on the
record that prospective relief remains necessary to correct a current
and ongoing violation of the Federal right . . . .”127 Section 802(c)
121
The high costs of institutional reform cases and the length of time necessary to
monitor compliance with the decree serve to limit the types of attorneys and firms that
can litigate these cases. See, e.g., ROSENBERG, supra note 3, at 91-93 (discussing the
costs of litigation and the importance of the NAACP’s involvement in school
desegregation cases); Schlanger, supra note 5, at 571-72 (discussing the public interest
organizations involved in prison reform cases seeking injunctive relief).
122
See Schlanger, supra note 5, at 600-01 (discussing funding for plaintiffs’ counsel
in institutional reform cases).
123
Professor Margo Schlanger has observed that relitigating the issue of liability in
the context of determining whether a decree should be terminated “can create an
extremely high hurdle for plaintiffs’ lawyers . . . [b]ecause much of their prior
preparation will be stale [and] they may need to reassemble a new array of evidence to
go to trial.” Id. at 627-28.
124
See id. at 591.
125
Tracking structural decrees poses significant research challenges, as decisions
are often unreported and conflicts are often resolved through settlement. See id. at 569
(noting difficulties in gathering data on court-ordered regulation because they are
often “completely unobservable by ordinary case research methods”).
126
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 802(a), 110 Stat.
1321, 1321-66 (1996).
127
Id. § 802(a), 110 Stat. at 1321-67 to -68 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3626(b)(1), (3) (2006)). The Act provides that such decrees are subject to
termination two years after entry, and every year thereafter, subject to the same
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expressly applies these limitations to consent decrees as well as courtordered injunctive decrees.128 Lower courts have interpreted these
provisions to impose the ultimate burden of persuasion on plaintiffprisoners to prove an ongoing violation of federal law to defeat
termination.129
Thus, similar to overbroad interpretations of Horne, the PLRA
replaces the language of Rule 60(b)(5), permitting termination of a
decree where “applying it prospectively is no longer equitable,” with
language requiring termination of a decree unless “relief remains
necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation” of federal law.130
Further, similar to some lower courts’ interpretation of Horne, the
PLRA’s limitations on permissible relief apply to consent decrees as
well as court-ordered injunctive decrees. Finally, at least some lower
courts have interpreted both the PLRA and Horne to impose the
ultimate burden of persuasion on whether dissolution is warranted on
plaintiffs rather than defendants.
By all accounts, the Prison Litigation Reform Act has been
successful in cabining the impact of institutional reform litigation in
the context of prison reform. An empirical study conducted by Margo
Schlanger found that “[b]y drastically widening the escape route for
correctional jurisdictions seeking to terminate court orders,” “the
PLRA has contributed to a major decline in the regulation of prisons
and jails by court order.”131 Other commentators, both sympathetic to
and critical of the PRLA, agree.132 To the extent that Horne mirrors
provisions of the PLRA, we might expect a similar decline in the
number of government institutions subject to federal court oversight
in coming years.

exception. Id.
128
Id. § 802(a), 110 Stat. at 1321-66, -68 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §
3626(a), (c)(1) (2006)).
129
Guajardo v. Tex. Dep’t. of Crim. Justice, 363 F.3d 392, 395-96 (5th Cir. 2004)
(stating agreement with “the great majority of courts to address this issue”); Skinner v.
Lampert, 457 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 1276-77 (D. Wyo. 2006). But see Clark v. California,
739 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1175, 1213 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (concluding that defendants failed
to carry their burden to terminate relief under PLRA).
130
But see Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 5, at 20-21 (suggesting that PLRA
arguably does not alter the standard for dissolution from prior case law).
131
Schlanger, supra note 5, at 602.
132
SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 4, at 183-92; William C. Collins, Bumps in
the Road to the Courthouse: The Supreme Court and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 24
PACE L. REV. 651, 669-70 (2004).
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III. TOWARD AN ACCOUNTABLE AND DELIBERATIVE PROCESS FOR
REFORM
Regardless of one’s views on the desirability of institutional reform
litigation, the overbroad reading that lower courts have attributed to
Horne v. Flores is subject to criticism for categorically amending one of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure without adhering to the formal
rule-amendment process mandated by the Rules Enabling Act. Lower
courts’ unilateral reinterpretation of Rule 60(b)(5) to significantly
compromise, or even foreclose, this model of social reform misses a
valuable opportunity to engage with the robust political and scholarly
discussions regarding the advantages and disadvantages of
institutional reform decrees, and the considerable differences across
decrees. In light of these differences, lower courts’ categorical
extension of Horne to all institutional reform decrees without
distinction violates the norms of rigorous study, deliberation, and
political accountability imposed by the Federal Rules.
In delegating to the Supreme Court the authority to promulgate
procedural rules through the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, Congress
was cognizant of the risk that the politically unaccountable Court
would develop procedural rules to achieve substantive policy goals, a
task properly left to the political branches.133 To protect against such
encroachment, the Act prohibits a properly promulgated rule from
being amended except through the formal process set forth in the
Rules Enabling Act.134 Specifically, the Act requires that any proposed
change to a procedural rule be subject to public comment; approved
by committees consisting of procedural scholars, lower court judges,
members of the bar, and representatives from the executive branch;
adopted by the Supreme Court; and subject to a six-month time period
for congressional consideration.135 Acknowledging the potential
impact that procedural rules may have on substantive rights, this
process ensures that any proposed change not only be subject to a
measure of democratic accountability, but also to a transparent and
rigorous process of empirical study and deliberation.136
133

Burbank, supra note 12, 541-42; Miller, supra note 12, at 84.
See Burbank, supra note 12, at 536 (“[O]nce made through ‘The Enabling Act
Process,’ these general rules can only be changed through that process (or by
legislation).”); Miller, supra note 12, at 84 (“[O]nly the rulemaking machinery or an
act of Congress can change a properly promulgated Federal Rule . . . .”).
135
28 U.S.C. §§ 2071(b), 2073(a), 2074(a) (2006); see also Carrington, supra note
12, at 605 (describing process of rulemaking in practice).
136
Carrington, supra note 12, at 605 (“This political process had several virtues:
transparency, disinterest, access to advice and empirical data, and a measure of
134
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This Part argues that changes to Rule 60(b)(5) should undergo the
formal rule-amendment process, which offers significant benefits over
the lower courts’ current approach of ad hoc judicial decision-making.
First, the formal rule-amendment process offers a measure of
transparency and democratic accountability, critically important in
light of the normatively contentious debate over the legitimacy of this
model of social reform. Second, the formal rule-amendment process
would allow for careful empirical study of the effectiveness of
institutional reform decrees, crucial to determine whether the costs of
such decrees outweigh their benefits. Finally, unlike the current
categorical approach of some of the lower courts — treating all
institutional reform decrees with equal suspicion — the formal ruleamendment process would allow for a nuanced consideration of
institutional reform decrees in their myriad forms. The careful
deliberation of the rule-amendment process would consider the
differences between, for example, decrees enforcing statutory rights
and those enforcing constitutional rights, between experimentalist
decrees and those following a command-and-control model, or
between consent decrees and court-imposed injunctive decrees. As
developed more fully below, such decrees vary significantly in terms of
their likely effectiveness in reforming government institutions, the
risks they pose to federalism and separation-of-powers principles, and
their administrative efficiency. For these reasons, efforts to reform
Rule 60(b)(5) should take into account these varied considerations.
A. Transparent and Democratically Accountable Debate
In light of the normative contentiousness of the debate over
institutional reform litigation, changes to the standard or burden for
terminating institutional reform decrees should not be accomplished
through judicial fiat. Rather, they should be subject to the
transparency and democratic accountability provided by the formal
rule-amendment process.
The contest over the legitimacy of institutional reform litigation has
occupied scholars almost since the emergence of this model of social
reform.137 This contest typically pits those who would emphasize the
accountability to all three branches of government.”); see also A. Benjamin Spencer,
Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 454 (2008); The Supreme Court, 2006 Term –
Leading Cases, 121 HARV. L. REV. 305, 313 (2007).
137
See, e.g., Koski, supra note 13, at 793 (noting in 2009 that “in the last three
years alone, four full volumes have been published that take a decidedly skeptical, if
not outright hostile, view of court intervention in public schooling”). Compare
HANUSHEK & LINDSETH, supra note 4, at 83-117 (questioning democratic legitimacy of
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need for political accountability and deference to state and local
policymakers, on the one hand, against those who would emphasize
the need for judicial enforcement of individual rights and minority
interests, on the other.138
Opponents of institutional reform litigation have challenged the
legitimacy of structural decrees entered by politically unaccountable
federal courts in light of the proper allocation of powers in our
constitutional system.139 For example, Ross Sandler and David
Schoenbrod have argued that the administration of state and local
institutions — be they public schools, prisons, or hospitals — are
properly left to the political branches of state and local governments,
not the federal judiciary. In this way, structural decrees raise the
countermajoritarian concerns of all judge-made law, creating legal
standards unconstrained by the traditional mechanisms of democratic
accountability.
A related critique of institutional reform litigation raises concerns
about the subversion of democratic accountability where elected
officials use structural decrees as “political cover” to achieve policies
aligned with their personal preferences but for which they do not want
to be held politically accountable.140 As frequently observed, putative
defendants sometimes welcome institutional reform litigation because
institutional reform litigation), and SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 4, at 4-9
(same), with Chayes, supra note 2, at 1313-16 (defending legitimacy of institutional
reform litigation), Fiss, supra note 2, at 6-7, 29-44 (same), Jeffries & Rutherglen,
supra note 4, at 1411-13, 1422 (same), Rebell, supra note 3, 1529-38 (same), and Sabel
& Simon, supra note 2, at 1100 (same).
138
Debates over the legitimacy of institutional reform litigation also frequently take
on partisan undertones. See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 5, at 74-75 (arguing that debate
over court involvement in education reform tends to break down along partisan lines);
Schlanger, supra note 5, at 556-57 (describing contest over institutional reform
litigation as one between progressives and conservatives); Tushnet & Yackle, supra
note 5, at 13-22 (analyzing Republican challenges to institutional reform litigation).
139
See generally SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 4, at 4-5 (criticizing lack of
democratic accountability in institutional reform litigation); Gilles, supra note 5, at
159-61 (discussing federalism and separation-of-powers concerns over structural
reform litigation as voiced by conservatives such as Justice Clarence Thomas and
Professor John Yoo, as well as overall political disavowal of “judicial activism”).
140
See HANUSHEK & LINDSBETH, supra note 4, at 140-41 (describing collusion
between plaintiffs and the school systems that serve as putative defendants in
education reform litigation); SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 4, at 3-5; Horowitz,
supra note 4, at 1294-95; see also Sabel & Simon, supra note 2, at 1093 (“[T]he most
plausible separation-of-powers objection to the role of the court . . . is not that it
usurped executive responsibilities, but that it allowed the use of its office to give
political cover to a governor who should have taken responsibility for the decision on
his own.”).
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a victory for plaintiffs often results in increased budgets and resources
for defendants’ operations.141 For example, suppose that a class of
students with disabilities sues a superintendent alleging substandard
special education services in violation of the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act. The superintendent has an incentive to
concede liability and submit to a decree enforceable through the court,
as the decree is likely to result in increases in legislative funding for
special education programs — increases which, presumably, would
have failed through ordinary political processes. These judicially
enforceable agreements become immune from subsequent reversal
through the normal political process, even after the initial defendant is
no longer in office.
Defenders of institutional reform litigation, for their part, counter
these charges by arguing that the separation of powers and political
independence of the federal judiciary are necessary precisely to protect
the rights of politically powerless groups — be they ethnic or racial
minorities, language minorities, individuals with disabilities,
prisoners, or mental health patients — against majoritarian
preferences.142 In the words of Professor Chayes, “one may ask
whether democratic theory really requires deference to majoritarian
outcomes whose victims are prisoners, inmates of mental institutions,
and ghetto dwellers.”143 This defense of institutional reform litigation
views the federal courts as playing a critical role in mitigating the
excesses of democracy. Where the executive and legislative branches
of state and local government have denied rights to politically
vulnerable populations, the need for courts to remediate such denials
outweighs the need to defer to majoritarian principles.144
This ultimately normative question of whether the cost to
democratic accountability outweighs the benefit of robust judicial
protection of individual rights and minority interests in institutional
reform litigation is undoubtedly a difficult one to resolve. But this very
141
See, e.g., Sabel & Simon, supra note 2, at 1092 (“[M]ore often than not, agency
heads or operations officers welcome the suit or at least concede many of the plaintiffs’
allegations.”); Parker, School Desegregation, supra note 36, at 1206 (noting that
defendants exhibit a great reluctance to even request dismissal); Schlanger, supra note
5, at 562-63 (noting that prison officials are often collaborators in the prisonconditions litigation, hoping that a victory for plaintiffs will increase their budgets).
142
See Chayes, supra note 2, at 1307, 1314 (noting that judicial insulation from
“narrow political pressures” presents an institutional advantage); Rebell, supra note 3,
at 1538; see also United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938);
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 74 (1980).
143
Chayes, supra note 2, at 1315.
144
See Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 4, at 1387.
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difficulty counsels against unilateral procedural rulemaking by the
judiciary alone. Indeed, the politicized nature of the debate, evident
from continuing congressional battles to amend the standards
governing institutional reform litigation, render the judiciary’s
unilateral attempt to resolve the issue through a reinterpretation of
one of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure — rules that are supposed
to be substantively neutral — particularly inappropriate.
The passage of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, described in the
preceding part, which reduced the standard for terminating
institutional reform decrees in prison cases, exemplifies the partisan
battle lines in Congress. Republicans urged adoption of the PLRA to
restore responsibility over prison administration to state and local
policymakers. Senator Robert Dole testified that the act was necessary
“to restrain liberal Federal judges who see violations of constitutional
rights in every prisoner complaint and who have used these
complaints to micromanage State and local prison systems.”145 Senator
Spencer Abraham similarly maintained, “In many jurisdictions . . .
judicial orders entered under Federal law have effectively turned
control of the prison system from elected officials accountable to the
taxpayer, and over to the courts. The courts, in turn, raise the costs of
running prisons far beyond what is necessary.”146
Democrats opposed the proposal on the ground that it would
unduly compromise judicial protections for prisoners’ rights. For
example, Senator Edward Kennedy warned that the PLRA “would
radically and unwisely curtail the power of the Federal courts to
remedy constitutional and statutory violations in prisons, jails, and
juvenile detention facilities”147 and expressed “great concern that the
bill would set a dangerous precedent of stripping the Federal courts of
the ability to safeguard the civil rights of powerless and disadvantaged
groups.”148 The politicized nature of the PLRA debates suggests that
determining the appropriate termination standard for institutional
reform decrees is ill-suited for unilateral resolution by the
democratically unaccountable judiciary.
Indeed, judicial imposition of a PLRA-like termination standard for
all institutional reform decrees is particularly inappropriate in light of
145

141 CONG. REC. S14414 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Robert

Dole).
146
141 CONG. REC. S14419 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Spencer
Abraham).
147
142 CONG. REC. S2296 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1996) (statement of Sen. Edward
Kennedy).
148
Id. at S2296-97.
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Congress’s failed attempts to extend the PLRA’s standards to cases
brought on behalf of more sympathetic constituencies such as
schoolchildren or mental health patients. In 1998, Senators Orrin
Hatch and Strom Thurmond proposed the Judicial Improvement Act,
which, among other things, would mandate termination of all
prospective decrees binding state or local officials unless “the federal
court makes written findings based on the record that relief remains
necessary to correct an ongoing violation of law.”149 Similarly, the
proposed Federal Consent Decree Fairness Act,150 first introduced in
2005 and most recently reintroduced in 2011, would enable state or
local government officials to terminate prospective consent decrees
within strict time limits (within four years of entry or upon expiration
of a predecessor’s term of office), unless the plaintiff satisfies a burden
of persuasion “to demonstrate that the denial of the motion to modify
or terminate the consent decree or any part of the consent decree is
necessary to prevent the violation of a requirement of Federal law.” To
date, however, neither proposal has gained the political support
necessary for legislative enactment.
Yet, the lower courts have purported to accomplish what Congress
has failed to achieve legislatively, through a unilateral re-reading of
Rule 60(b)(5) — replacing that provision’s textual commitment to a
case-by-case balancing of the equities with a categorical rule mandating
termination unless the decree remains necessary to prevent an ongoing
violation of federal law. In light of Congress’s repeated failure to garner
the political support for amending the standard for terminating
institutional reform decrees beyond the prison context, the judiciary’s
unilateral attempt to do so, under the auspices of procedural rule, is
particularly suspect. A superior method for considering changes to the
standard or burden for terminating institutional reform decrees would
be through the open, transparent, and politically accountable process
mandated by the Rules Enabling Act.

149
144 CONG. REC. S6187 (daily ed. June 11, 1998); see also Steven G. Calabresi,
The Congressional Roots of Judicial Activism, 20 J. L. & POL. 577, 585 (2004)
(proposing that Congress legislate limits to federal district court injunctive authority
in institutional reform cases).
150
H.R. 3041, 112th Cong. (2011). The bill was referred to the Subcommittee on
Courts, Commercial and Administrative Law on October 12, 2011. See The Library of
Congress, THOMAS, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/D?d112:1:./
temp/~bssjXLm:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited May 22, 2012).
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B. Empirical Study of the Effectiveness of Institutional Reform Decrees
The deliberative process mandated by the Rules Enabling Act would
also allow for the rigorous empirical study necessary to determine the
relative costs and benefits of institutional reform decrees. Scholars
have debated the effectiveness of institutional reform litigation for
almost as long as they have debated its legitimacy. Influenced by legal
process theories,151 critics of institutional reform litigation question
the institutional capacity of federal courts to achieve systemic reform
of state and local bureaucratic institutions, emphasizing the lack of
judicial expertise on the relevant policy issues, courts’ limited access
to information, and the difficulty courts face in monitoring the streetlevel bureaucrats responsible for actual implementation.152 Defenders
of institutional reform litigation counter by claiming that
notwithstanding the institutional limits of the judiciary, federal courts
are at least as well equipped to implement meaningful reform as their
legislative and executive counterparts.153
To date, empirical research on the effectiveness of judicial decrees in
reforming public institutions is mixed. For example, Gerald
Rosenberg’s research suggests that courts have limited ability to
improve state and local bureaucracies, while empirical studies
conducted by Michael Rebell suggest that courts are more effective
than other institutions.154
This evidence suggests that the debate over the effectiveness of
public law litigation is far from over, and likely will only be resolved,
if at all, with further empirical study. Consequently, any future
151
See, e.g., Lon Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353,
394 (1978) (developing concept of “polycentric” problems ill-suited for judicial
resolution).
152
See, e.g., HANUSHEK & LINDSETH, supra note 4, 139-44 (describing institutional
limits to judicial capacity to implement effective educational reform); R. Shep
Melnick, Taking Remedies Seriously: Can Courts Control Public Schools?, in FROM
SCHOOLHOUSE TO COURTHOUSE: THE JUDICIARY’S ROLE IN EDUCATION, supra note 5, at 17,
24 (describing school systems as closed bureaucracies resistant to judicial reform); see
also Michael Heise, Litigated Learning and the Limits of Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2417,
2420 (2004); Donald R. Horowitz, supra note 4, at 1265.
153
See Koski, supra note 13, at 803; Rebell, supra note 3, at 1531-32.
154
Compare HANUSHEK & LINDSETH, supra note 4, at 145-70 (conducting empirical
studies to conclude that courts are ineffective in improving student academic
performance), and Rosenberg, supra note 3 (conducting empirical studies suggesting
that courts working independently of the other branches of federal government have
limited influence in effectuating national social change), with Rebell, supra note 3, at
1531-32 (citing studies Rebell conducted with Arthur Block suggesting that courts
have been more effective in improving educational opportunities than administrative
of legislative institutions).
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proposal to amend the standard or burden for terminating institutional
reform decrees should consider, and perhaps commission, empirical
studies of the effectiveness of judicial decrees in reforming
government institutions. The formal rule-amendment process
mandated by the Rules Enabling Act, which provides a mechanism for
developing and considering exactly these types of empirical studies,
should be employed in this context.
C. Nuanced Consideration of Institutional Reform Decrees in Their
Myriad Forms
Finally, the formal rule-amendment process would allow for careful
consideration of the considerable differences across decrees. Language
in the Horne opinion suggests that institutional reform litigation
against government-defendants pose special federalism and
separation-of-powers dangers,155 and at least some lower courts have
interpreted Horne to categorically treat all institutional reform cases
with the same degree of skepticism and subject to the same new
standard for termination without distinction. As a growing body of
scholarship indicates, however, not all institutional reform decrees are
the same. Some decrees seek to enforce statutory rights, while others
seek to enforce constitutional rights; some employ innovative
“experimentalist” models, while others employ more traditional
“command and control” approaches; some are entered into with the
consent of the parties, while others are imposed by the court. These
differences significantly impact a decree’s effectiveness in reforming
public institutions and efficiency, as well as the costs the decree poses
to federalism, separation-of-powers, and democratic accountability
principles. In light of these differences, it may well be that differing
standards for termination should apply to different types of decrees.
1.

Decrees to Enforce Statutory Rather than Constitutional Rights

In terms of a threat to the proper allocation of powers, institutional
decrees seeking to enforce congressionally-created rights pose fewer
federalism and separation-of-powers concerns than those seeking to
enforce constitutional rights. In cases enforcing statutory rights, the
federal court is properly understood to be enforcing the popular will
of Congress, thereby eliminating separation-of-powers concerns. In
155
Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 447-48 (2009) (discussing special concerns of
institutional reform litigation); id. at 473-74 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing the
majority as “set[ting] forth special ‘institutional reform litigation’ standards applicable
when courts are asked to modify judgments and decrees entered in such cases”).
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cases such as those arising under the Equal Educational Opportunities
Act or the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, in which
Congress has delegated to the courts the duty to provide substantive
meaning to the rights guaranteed therein through the express grant of
a private right of action, concerns about judicial intrusion into the
legislative function are particularly inapposite.156 As to federalism
concerns, the supremacy of congressional statute over conflicting state
and local policies is firmly established. Finally, judicial decisions
interpreting a congressional statute are, at least in theory, subject to
some measure of democratic accountability, as political displeasure
could result in Congress “correcting” a mistaken judicial
interpretation of its will through subsequent repeal or amendment of
the statute at issue.157 Justice Breyer’s dissent in Horne noted this
distinction, suggesting that the traditional concerns about institutional
reform litigation are more commonly associated with the enforcement
of constitutional standards and do not necessarily apply to decrees
enforcing federal statutory requirements.158
In light of these differences, any proposal to alter the standard or
burden for terminating institutional reform decrees should consider
the differing costs to federalism and separation-of-powers principles
posed by decrees enforcing statutory, as opposed to constitutional,
interests. Such consideration might even generate a consensus to
impose one standard for terminating decrees enforcing statutory rights
and another one for terminating decrees enforcing constitutional
interests.
2.

Experimentalist Decrees

A second major distinction between institutional reform decrees that
should be considered in determining the appropriate standard for
156
See Chayes, supra note 2, at 1314 (“For cases brought under an Act of Congress
rather than the Constitution, the problem [of reconciling public law litigation with the
majoritarian premises of American political life], formally at least, is not difficult. The
courts can be said to engaged in carrying out the legislative will, and the legitimacy of
judicial action can be understood to rest on a delegation from the people’s
representatives.”); Koski, supra note 13, at 796-97 (noting that separation of powers
critique of institutional reform litigation misplaced in cases involving the IDEA, in
which Congress crafts an active role for courts to fashion remedies for violations of
special education rights); Sabel & Simon, supra note 2, at 1090 (noting instances in
which legislature has authorized structural relief).
157
See Chayes, supra note 2, at 1314 (“[T]he judiciary is also, at least in theory,
accountable: if Congress is dissatisfied with the execution of its charge, it can act to
modify or withdraw the delegation.”).
158
See Horne, 557 U.S. at 496-97.
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termination involves the extent to which decrees micromanage the
target government institution. In recent years, a number of influential
scholars — notably Professors Charles Sabel and William Simon —
have observed the emergence of an innovative “experimentalist”
model of institutional reform and maintain that this model moots
many of the concerns associated with traditional institutional reform
decrees.159
In the initial desegregation cases, decrees tended to adhere to a topdown “command-and-control approach,” in which the court would
dictate a series of procedural steps the government-defendant would
need to undertake to establish compliance.160 Through these decrees,
the court would often dictate the policies and practices relating to the
day-to-day operation of schools, perhaps mandating a particular
number of buses or bus routes, or requiring particular teacherrecruiting practices, for example.161
Through time, however, a second model emerged, one that focused
not on the day-to-day operation of public institutions, but rather on
the “inputs” — namely funding levels — committed to the institution.
Popularized in the education context with the emergence of the
second-wave of school finance cases focusing on educational equity,
decrees employing this model typically required the governmentdefendant to provide a minimum level of funding to the institution or
program at issue.162 The Horne case itself involved a decree based on

159
Sabel & Simon, supra note 2, at 1016; Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 4, at
1422; Koski, supra note 13, at 789; Liebman & Sabel, supra note 4, at 184; Rebell,
supra note 3, at 1539-41.
160
See Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 4, at 1411-12 (describing traditional
“command-and-control” type decrees); Sabel & Simon, supra note 2, at 1019-21
(same).
161
See Sabel & Simon, supra note 2, at 1024 (“[O]nce the courts saw improving
educational quality as a remedial goal, almost every aspect of education policy was
potentially relevant. When defendants were recalcitrant, the courts tended to increase
both the scope and the detail of their orders. Thus, consent decrees often took the
form of highly detailed regulatory codes embracing vast provinces of
administration.”). For an example of a federal decree employing this type of approach
in more recent years, see e.g., Consent Decree, AB v. Rhinebeck Central Sch. Dist., No.
03 Civ. 3241 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2006) (requiring defendant to retain an expert,
conduct a school climate assessment, provide a mandatory education and training
program for school board members, employees, and students, and develop a
comprehensive plan to prevent, identify, and remediate harassment and
discrimination on the basis of sex), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/edu/
documents/rcsdor.pdf.
162
See Heise, State Constitutions, supra note 13, at 1157-62.

2013]

Changed Circumstances

1479

this model, mandating the state of Arizona to provide funding for ELL
programs that was reasonably related to actual needs.163
Most recently, a number of scholars have observed that decrees have
begun to adopt a third “experimentalist” approach.164 As described by
Professors Sabel and Simon, the purpose of these decrees is not to
micromanage the daily operation of institutions, nor is it to dictate the
level of resources that must be devoted to them. Rather, the purpose is
to destabilize the status quo to permit “new publics” that are
accountable to traditionally disenfranchised groups to emerge.165 The
role of the court, then, is merely to convene these stakeholders who
negotiate, under principles of collaboration and consensus,
substantive goals in the form of outcome performance measures of
compliance.166 They describe:
[E]xperimentalist regulation combines more flexible and
provisional norms with procedures for ongoing stakeholder
participation and measured accountability. In the most
distinctive cases, the governing norms are general standards
that express the goals the parties are expected to achieve – that
is, outputs rather than inputs. Typically, the regime leaves the
parties with a substantial range of discretion as to how to
achieve these goals. At the same time, it specifies both
standards and procedures for the measurement of the
institution’s performance. Performance is measured both in
relation to parties’ initial commitments and in relation to the
performance of comparable institutions.167
Scholars contend that this new experimentalist model moots many
of the traditional critiques against institutional reform litigation.168
Concerns regarding the limited institutional capacity of the judiciary
in developing policy solutions are mitigated by the fact that the court
is not, in experimentalist decrees, imposing a top-down decree; rather,
the officials responsible for implementation retain discretion to
determine the particular policies to be employed in order to achieve

163
See also, e.g., Blackman v. District of Columbia, 454 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C.
2006) (approving consent decree requiring government-defendant to provide $15
million to remedy systemic violations of the IDEA in the provision of special
education benefits in the District of Columbia).
164
See sources cited supra note 159.
165
See Sabel & Simon, supra note 2, at 1020.
166
Id. at 1019.
167
Id.
168
Id. at 1016, 1082-1100.
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the consensually developed performance goals. Similarly, the critical
role played by these officials in shaping the remedy minimizes the
concern regarding judicial encroachment on state and local
policymaking functions: again, the court is not the institution
determining the particular policies to be employed; rather, its role is
limited to facilitating an ongoing dialogue between stakeholders.
Finally, experimentalist decrees arguably mitigate concerns about the
use of decrees as “political cover” to obtain the preferred policy
preferences of elected officials who do not want to be held politically
accountable for those preferences. They do so by imposing
transparency in the setting of policymaking goals and accountability
for their achievement. In these ways, proponents argue that
experimentalist decrees actually enhance democratic accountability.169
Future attempts to modify the standard or burden for terminating
institutional reform decrees should determine whether the cost-benefit
calculus associated with experimentalist decrees is sufficiently
different from that associated with command-and-control or other
types of decrees to warrant applying a different standard. Such study
might conclude that while the costs (in terms of effectiveness,
democratic accountability, etc.) associated with command-and-control
decrees outweigh their potential benefits (in terms of enforcement of
individual rights), the same is not true for experimentalist decrees. If
so, it may well be that these different types of decrees should be
subject to different standards for termination.
3.

Consent Decrees

A third major distinction among institutional reform decrees is
between those entered with the consent of the parties and those
imposed by the court. These two categories threaten democratic
accountability to differing degrees and pose a dramatically different
calculus for the efficient administration of the judicial system. For
these reasons, it is not at all clear that these two types of decrees
should be subject to the same termination standard.
As others have observed, institutional reform decrees entered with
the consent of the parties, especially those imposed prior to a finding
of liability, pose the greatest threat to principles of democratic
accountability. In these cases, putative defendants are most likely to
have colluded with plaintiffs to design a decree that reaches far beyond
the defendants’ legal obligations but aligns with both groups’ private
policy preferences. By contrast, in cases in which defendants have
169

Id. at 1093-94.
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litigated and lost on the question of liability, defendants are less likely
to have negotiated a sweetheart deal with plaintiffs.170 Justice Breyer’s
dissent underscored this distinction in Horne, pointing out that the
decree imposed in that case — by the court after a finding of liability
— did not implicate the same concerns about party collusion as
ordinary consent decrees.171 These differences suggest that decrees
entered with the consent of the parties, perhaps even more than courtordered injunctions, compromise principles of democratic
accountability in a manner that justifies an easing of the standard and
burden for terminating them.
Yet, extending the Horne rule — requiring termination of a decree
unless the court finds it remains necessary to correct an ongoing
violation of law — to consent decrees imposes significant costs, not
only to the parties, but also to the judicial system as a whole. As the
debates surrounding the proposed Consent Decree Fairness Act
demonstrate, such a rule would discourage settlements because
plaintiffs would have an incentive to proceed through trial on the
issue of both liability and remedy. Defendants, for their part, would
spend their limited resources on litigating these cases through trial,
rather than devoting those resources to improving their institutions;
indeed, litigation might ultimately cost more than implementing a
consent decree. And, the court system as a whole would be required to
accommodate the resulting increase in workload.172
170

See generally Michael W. McConnell, Why Hold Elections? Using Consent Decrees
to Insulate Policies from Political Change, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 295 (1987) (discussing
special problem of consent decrees).
171
Justice Breyer noted in his dissent:
[N]or is the decree at issue here a ‘consent decree’ as that term is normally
understood in the institutional litigation context . . . . [T]he State vigorously
contested the plaintiffs’ basic original claim . . . presented proofs and
evidence to the District Court designed to show that no violation of federal
law had occurred, and it opposed entry of the original judgment and every
subsequent injunctive order, save the relief sought by petitioners here. I can
find no evidence, beyond the Court’s speculation, showing that some state
officials ‘welcomed’ the District Court’s decision ‘as a means of achieving
appropriations objectives that could not [otherwise] be achieved.
Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 489 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 4, at 1413-14 (“[A]s nominal defendants,
[state officials] might take positions anywhere along a spectrum from active
opposition to tacit support of plaintiffs’ claims.”).
172
See Federal Consent Decree Fairness Act: Hearing on H.R. 1229 Before the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 13 (2005) (statement of Hon. Nathaniel Jones,
Blank Rome LLP); Letter from Thomas Susman, Dir., Am. Bar Assoc., to Howard
Coble, Chairman, Subcomm. on Courts, Commercial and Admin. Law 2 (Feb. 1,
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For these reasons, consideration of the question of whether the
Horne standard should apply to consent decrees as well as courtordered injunctive relief would benefit from careful deliberation and
study. The very different costs and benefits associated with consent
decrees as opposed to injunctive decrees might well warrant
application of a different standard for terminating these two types of
decrees.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Article is not to resolve the long-standing debate
over the appropriate role of courts in reforming state and local
government institutions, or the efficacy or legitimacy of institutional
reform litigation as a whole. Whatever one’s views on these important
issues, this Article contends that process matters. The judiciary’s use
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to side with the opponents of
institutional reform litigation in a manner that circumvents the
democratic accountability and careful deliberation required by the
Rules Enabling Act fits poorly within our constitutional system.

2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/
2012feb1_federalconsentdecreefairnessact.authcheckdam.pdf; see also Harold Baer, A
Necessary and Proper Role for Federal Courts in Prison Reform, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 3,
61 (2007-2008).

